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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, an investigation by the New York Times found that “on more than 25
occasions since January 2015, judges or prosecutors determined that a key aspect
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of a New York City police officer’s testimony was probably untrue.”1 In order to
“skirt constitutional restrictions,” officers who have sworn an oath to tell the whole
truth falsified or embellished details to ensure a conviction.2 Reforms to prevent
“testilying” include mandating body cameras for plainclothes officers as well as for
patrol forces.3 But what is the solution when law enforcement officers lie on paper
instead of on the stand, like in the application for a search warrant?4 Police perjury
in search warrant affidavits, although rarely caught, is not unheard of5 and can have
incredible repercussions when it does occur.6 Two police officers in Texas were
indicted after one of them lied in multiple search warrant applications, leading to a
botched raid that killed two suspects.7 While many assume that the Fourth Amend-
ment Warrant Clause sufficiently deters police perjury, falsified warrant applications
are not such an anomaly.8 The answer to this problem may be found in suppression
hearings.9




3 Joseph Goldstein, Police ‘Testilying’ Remains a Problem. Here Is How the Criminal
Justice System Could Reduce It, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/03/22/nyregion/police-lying-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/2NYA-UDNZ].
4 For a recent example of the consequences of lying in a search warrant affidavit, see
Mariah Medina, ‘Unethical, Immoral and Criminal’: Kerrville Police Survey Reveals Tension




officer resignation after police department failed to discipline sergeant accused of lying in
a search warrant affidavit).
5 See Isaac Avilucea, Trenton Cop Facing Dismissal for Lying on Search Warrant in
Federal Drug Case, TRENTONIAN (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.trentonian.com/news/trenton
-cop-facing-dismissal-for-lying-on-search-warrant-in-federal-drug-case/article_095ae374-da
cd-11ea-8850-2fccc3e64879.html [https://perma.cc/T4MN-LLVV].
6 For a chilling look at the repercussions of lying in a search warrant affidavit, see Sarah
Mervosh, Houston Officer Lied About Confidential Informant in Deadly Drug Operation, Chief
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/us/houston-police
-gerald-goines.html [https://perma.cc/MGU8-RM4T] (reporting that four officers were shot and
two suspects were killed when an officer lied in an affidavit for a search warrant that led to
a raid).
7 Grand Jury Indicts Former HPD Officers for Alleged Involvement in Harding Street
Raid, KHOU11 (Jan. 15, 2020, 4:23 PM), https://www.khou.com/article/news/local/grand
-jury-indicts-former-hpd-officers-for-alleged-involvement-in-harding-street-raid/285-6ee4
7088-f845-4107-a829-9bd44d69541e [https://perma.cc/8WXW-LWX5].
8 See Stephen W. Gard, Bearing False Witness: Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth
Amendment, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2008).
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This Note asserts that Franks was an essential development in protecting the
Warrant Clause. “Redlining” and appending an affidavit to a judicial opinion may
seem trivial, but it is an essential step toward preserving the foundation not only of
Franks challenges but also the Fourth Amendment.24
Part I provides a brief overview of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause, and
the exclusionary rule.25 Part II discusses Franks v. Delaware,26 the development of the
challenge’s framework,27 and subsequent expansions to the doctrine made by the lower
courts.28 Next, Part III argues that, despite the aforementioned expansions, courts have
consistently weakened Franks.29 Notably, the Supreme Court refuses to consider
Franks issues,30 including the multitude of splits over which standard of review is
applicable.31 Moreover, some circuits have developed their own minute rules that have
chiseled away at the effectiveness of a Franks challenge.32 Part IV proposes that the
solution is to require judges to “redline” the challenged affidavit and appended it to
the final judicial opinion.33 Part V addresses the potential critiques of this course of
action, none of which this Note finds entirely convincing.34 Ultimately, this Note
asserts that appending a corrected affidavit is a small price to pay for clarity.35
I. BACK TO THE BASICS: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, PROBABLE
CAUSE, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment, probable cause, and the exclusionary rule work in
tandem to ensure every citizen’s right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”36 When law enforcement
can demonstrate “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place,” then a court may issue a warrant.37 However, nefarious
police conduct will “trigger the exclusionary rule.”38 In order to deter “unlawful
police conduct[,] . . . evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed” if the
24 See infra Part V.
25 See infra Part I.
26 438 U.S. 154 (1978); see infra Section II.B.
27 See infra Section II.C.
28 See infra Section II.D.
29 See infra Part III.
30 See infra Section III.A.
31 See infra Section III.B.
32 See infra Section III.C.
33 See infra Part IV.
34 See infra Part V.
35 See infra Conclusion.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
38 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
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officer knew or should have known that “the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.”39
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause guarantees that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”40 After
some investigation, “absent certain exceptions, police [must] obtain a warrant from
a neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search.”41 The “disinter-
ested” magistrate is entrusted to determine probable cause because “[s]ecurity
against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained . . . than by reliance upon the
caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends
the capture of persons accused of crime.”42 In theory, magistrates are the ideal
official to make an “independent evaluation of the matter,”43 because they will make
an “informed and deliberate determination[] . . . as to what searches and seizures are
permissible under the Constitution” which is “to be preferred over the hurried action
of officers and others who may happen to make arrests.”44
The implicit core of the Warrant Clause is the assumption that the affiant has
truthfully presented the magistrate with all of the relevant facts required to make this
independent evaluation.45 The fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is
the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner.46
The magistrate is meant to act as a barrier to protect citizens’ privacy interests against
overzealous law enforcement.47
B. Probable Cause
Probable cause is the determinative factor for issuing a search warrant;48 however,
with no definition of probable cause in the Constitution, it is hard to determine the
exact threshold that law enforcement officers must meet.49 While applicants must
39 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975).
40 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
41 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) (holding that obtaining such a warrant
was a requirement).
42 Id.; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
43 Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.
44 Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 464.
45 See Gard, supra note 8, at 445–46.
46 See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (citing United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984)).
47 See Nirej Sekhon, Dangerous Warrants, 93 WASH. L. REV. 967, 973–75 (2018).
48 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
49 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32 (1983).
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demonstrate a probability that evidence will be found in the place to be searched,
probable cause “means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.”50
Probable cause is a fact-bounded issue that changes to reflect the “totality of the
circumstances.”51
The malleability of the standard is reflected in the Supreme Court’s description
in Illinois v. Gates: “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment
of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.”52 Basically, the narrative that law enforcement presents
has serious consequences on whether a judge decides that probable cause is present.53
Thus, the “commonsense decision”54 can easily become more about the affiant’s
conclusions than the actual substance of the investigation.55
C. The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule empowers courts to exclude certain evidence if law enf-
orcement officers obtained it through conduct that violated the Fourth Amendment.56
The rule is meant to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, but the Supreme Court made
clear that it is “not ‘a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’”57 Therefore,
the purpose is not a personal remedy, but “to deter—to compel respect for the co-
nstitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive
to disregard it.”58
The policy behind the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of unconstitutional
police conduct.59 The Supreme Court in Herring v. United States emphasized that
the rule “serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”60 Consequently, evidence should
only be suppressed if the officer knew or should have known that the search was
50 Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813).
51 Gates, 462 U.S. at 241.
52 Id. at 232.
53 See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX.L.REV. 913,
917 (2009).
54 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
55 See Jodi Levine Avergun, Note, The Impact of Illinois v. Gates: The States Consider
the Totality of the Circumstances Test, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 1127, 1143 (1987) (“Because the
totality of the circumstances test obviates the necessity for providing complete information
to an issuing magistrate, and forces that magistrate to rely on affiants’ conclusions, the probable
cause requirement is greatly weakened.”).
56 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 659 (1961).
57 Gates, 462 U.S. at 223 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
58 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599–600 (1975) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
59 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
60 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
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unconstitutional.61 The officer’s actions must have been “deliberate” and “culpable”
to justify “the price paid by the justice system.”62 Allowing such illegally seized evi-
dence devalues “judicial integrity” and “contaminat[es] . . . the judicial process.”63
In the context of Franks, the purpose “served by suppression of such evidence is
deterrence of falsified testimony on the part of affiant in the future.”64 Excluding
evidence is the high cost the affiant must pay for misleading the magistrate.65
II. GETTING TO THE TRUTH: DEVELOPING FRANKS
Before its decision in Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court never outright
rejected challenging the warrant’s veracity as having no legal grounds but ruled that
the misstatements were either periphery concerns or that too broad of an ability to
challenge warrants would hinder law enforcement and the judicial system.66 Instead,
defendants challenged warrants as facially lacking probable cause67 or failing to
meet the unambiguous requirement.68 The defense’s toolbox grew after Franks v.
Delaware.69
A. Challenging Warrants Pre-Franks
The Supreme Court, prior to Franks, briefly discussed a defendant’s ability to
challenge the veracity of an affidavit in United States v. Rugendorf.70 Until this time,
the Court had never “passed directly on the extent to which a court may permit such
examination when the search warrant [was] valid on its face and when the allegations
of the underlying affidavit establish[ed] probable cause.”71 However, the Court, for
the sake of that particular case, assumed that even if the defendant could have made
this kind of attack, the warrant was still valid.72 In its explanation, the Court rea-
soned that the allegations “were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of
probable cause, and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not
go to the integrity of the affidavit.”73
61 See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975).
62 Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
63 Stone, 428 U.S. at 484 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).
64 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 186 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65 See Mary Nicol Bowman, Full Disclosure: Cognitive Science, Informants, and Search
Warrant Scrutiny, 47 AKRON L. REV. 431, 491 (2014).
66 See, e.g., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 532 (1964); United States v.
Thornton, 454 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
67 See, e.g., Rugendorf, 376 U.S. at 531; Thornton, 454 F.2d at 966.
68 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004).
69 See infra Section II.C.
70 See generally 376 U.S. 528.
71 Id. at 531–32.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 532.
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In United States v. Thornton, the D.C. Circuit rejected a veracity challenge as
contrary to the deference owed to magistrate judges.74 After weighing the burdens
the proposed procedure would entail against “the risks posed by warrants issued on
[a] perjured affidavit,” the court rejected “[the] bland and sweeping claim [of] the
right to try the affiant in every case, with no foundation beyond the hope that some
inaccuracy or falsehood may emerge.”75 However, the court acknowledged that the
challenge would be different if there was already a showing of some falsehood.76
Overall, prior to Franks, there was never an outright rejection by the Supreme Court
that defendants could challenge the truthfulness of the affiant.77
Prior to the Court’s decision in Franks, eleven states outright prohibited veracity
challenges, and another two barred impeachment challenges that were directed at the
nature of the allegations within the affidavit.78 “The federal circuits [were] split on
this question in the absence of Supreme Court pronouncement,” with a majority of
federal courts permitting these kinds of challenges.79
Because of the lack of enthusiasm surrounding scrutinizing the affidavit, de-
fendants often resorted to other ways to invalidate search warrants.80 Defendants were
essentially limited to contesting either the sufficiency or the particularity of the war-
rant.81 When raising an issue with the sufficiency of the warrant, the defendant is only
saying that the government has not met its burden in demonstrating probable cause.82
The person issuing the warrant must determine whether it “pass[es] muster” under
both the Constitution and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.83 As previously
74 454 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
75 Id. (quoting United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
76 Id. (quoting Halsey, 257 F. Supp. at 1006) (“The court admonished, however, that
‘[t]he problem may be quite different where some initial showing of some sort . . . is
tendered.’”) (alterations in original).
77 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 159–60 (1978) (noting that the Court has
reserved the issue of sub-facial challenges to the veracity of a search warrant affidavit).
78 Id. at 159 n.3.
79 Comment, Controverting Probable Cause in Facially Sufficient Affidavits, 63 J.CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 41, 42 (1972).
80 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (challenging a warrant for failing
to meet the unambiguous requirement); Michael Lowe, Challenging the Search Warrant in
Texas: Illegal Search and Seizure, DALLASJUSTICE.COM (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.dallas
justice.com/challenging-the-search-warrant-in-texas-illegal-search-and-seizure/ [https://perma
.cc/YS5W-ZACQ] (outlining challenges based on a lack of probable cause, errors in time or
place, and regarding the four corners rule, before delving into Franks).
81 See Controverting Probable Cause in Facially Sufficient Affidavits, supra note 79, at 42.
82 Searches and Seizures Pursuant to Warrant, LEGAL INFO. INST. n.109, https://www
.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/searches-and-seizures-pursuant-to-warrant
[https://perma.cc/976Q-CH6A] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
83 H. Frank Way, Jr., Sufficiency of Warrants Under the Fourth Amendment, 49 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 612, 612 (1959); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (“[A]
magistrate judge . . . must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize
a person or property . . . .”).
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discussed, probable cause is a fluid standard that is often easy to meet.84 Therefore,
it is unlikely that a court will invalidate another judge’s finding.85
When contesting the particularity of a search warrant, the defendant asserts that
the warrant does not meet the unambiguous requirement.86 To be valid, a warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.87 This area of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has its own requirements and niche rules.88 Prac-
tically, officers have been able to circumvent this requirement by including “catchall”
provisions that allow them to look for any evidence connected to a particular offense.89
B. The Case
The defendant, Jerome Franks, was convicted of “rape, kidnaping, and burglary.”90
Cynthia Bailey, the victim, told police she had been sexually assaulted by a man with
a knife in her home.91 She gave a detailed description of her assailant’s outfit: “white
thermal undershirt, black pants with a gold or silver buckle, brown leather . . . coat,
and a dark knit cap.”92 The same day she gave her report, Franks was taken into
custody for assaulting a fifteen-year-old girl.93 Based on some suspicious statements
that Franks made while in custody, officers suspected that he was also responsible
for assaulting Bailey.94 The officers submitted an affidavit that swore that two of
Franks’s co-workers confirmed that Franks’s typical outfit matched the description
given by Bailey.95 After obtaining a warrant, officers searched Franks’s apartment
and found “a white thermal undershirt, a knit hat, dark pants, . . . a leather jacket,”
and a single-blade knife, all of which were introduced at trial.96
84 See supra Section I.B.
85 See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (holding that the sufficiency
of an affidavit “must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense
and realistic fashion”); Controverting Probable Cause in Facially Sufficient Affidavits, supra
note 79, at 42.
86 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 195 (1927).
87 Groh, 540 U.S. at 557.
88 See Joseph G. Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations, 38
TENN. L. REV. 496, 501–04, 509, 516 (1971).
89 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976); Jeff Welty, Particularly Describing
the Evidence to Be Seized Under a Search Warrant, N.C. CRIM. LAW (Feb. 26, 2018, 11:10
AM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/particularly-describing-evidence-seized-search-war
rant/ [https://perma.cc/C7DP-RSUE].




94 Id. at 156–57.
95 Id. at 157.
96 Id.
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Franks’s counsel moved for the suppression of the items found pursuant to the
warrant, arguing that the warrant facially lacked probable cause.97 Later, his lawyer
orally amended the challenge to attack the veracity of the affidavit.98 Defense counsel
asserted that Franks’s co-workers would testify that neither were interviewed by the
affiants and what they had told other officers was not exactly what was contained
within the affidavit.99
The question the Supreme Court ultimately answered in the affirmative was:
“Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding ever have the right, under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments . . . to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made
in an affidavit supporting the warrant?”100 The Supreme Court of Delaware believed
that the majority rule was that a defendant could not make a sub-facial challenge to
a warrant.101
In a very technical opinion, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires
a hearing on the merits if the defendant can make “a substantial preliminary showing
that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit” and “the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.”102 The Court emphasized that
the misstatements must be the product of deliberate action and not mere negligence.103
This case was different from Rugendorf because the Court was not convinced that
the jury would have convicted Franks had the district court suppressed the knife.104
At its core, this decision is based on the foundation of the Warrant Clause,
“which surely takes the affiant’s good faith as its premise.”105 While the affiant must
give a “truthful” showing, this does not mean that every fact must be true.106 Instead,
“truthful” means “that the information put forth is believed or appropriately ac-
cepted by the affiant as true.”107 Therefore, without the truth, the warrant must be
treated as facially lacking probable cause.108 An affiant who violates the mandate of
truth “usurps the constitutionally mandated role of the magistrate.”109
97 Id. at 157–58.
98 Id. at 158.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 155.
101 Id. at 160.
102 Id. at 155–56 (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 170 (“Our reluctance today to extend the rule of exclusion beyond instances of
deliberate misstatements, and those of reckless disregard, leaves a broad field where the
magistrate is the sole protection of a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights, namely, in instances
where police have been merely negligent in checking or recording the facts relevant to a
probable-cause determination.”).
104 See id. at 162–64.
105 Id. at 164 (“[W]e derive our ground from language of the Warrant Clause itself . . . .”).
106 Id. at 165.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 156.
109 Gard, supra note 8, at 457.
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C. The Framework
Simply showing false or misleading information in an affidavit does not auto-
matically result in suppression of the evidence.110 First, the district court will only order
a hearing if the defendant’s claims appear to have merit.111 To get a hearing, the defen-
dant must make a “substantial preliminary showing”112 that there were misstate-
ments, accompanied by an offer of proof.113 The defendant must show that the affiant
made these misstatements intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth; negli-
gence or mistake is not enough.114 The final piece of this substantial preliminary
showing is that the misstatements were necessary to the finding of probable cause.115
The defendant’s attack “must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more
than a mere desire to cross-examine.”116 This showing is meant to be a high standard
in order to prevent misuse or obstruction of justice.117 Once the defendant has cleared
the high hurdle that is the “substantial preliminary showing,” the defendant must prove
their claim by a preponderance of the evidence at a hearing.118 If the defendant meets
this burden, then the warrant is void and the fruits thereof must be suppressed.119
D. Subsequent Expansions
Franks challenges have not gone completely unchanged since the Supreme
Court’s 1978 decision. For example, the Supreme Court ensured that misstatements
could not be forgiven under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.120
In United States v. Leon, the Court held that, where an officer has acted in good faith
under a warrant issued by a magistrate, evidence should not be excluded even if the
warrant lacks probable cause.121 An officer should not be punished for the “magis-
trate’s error.”122 However, this does not apply when the affiant is actually a bad actor.123
Therefore, the Court explicitly stated that this exception cannot apply when the affiant
has intentionally misled the magistrate.124
110 See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 171.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 171–72.
116 Id. at 171.
117 Id. at 170.
118 Id. at 156.
119 Id.
120 See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
121 See id. at 918.
122 See id. at 921.
123 See id. at 923.
124 Id. (“Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge
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The biggest expansion, however, has not come from the Supreme Court but instead
the circuit courts. Although not considered in the Franks opinion, every circuit has
extended Franks to include challenges to omissions in the warrant affidavit.125 The
D.C. Circuit was one of the first courts to consider omissions in the context of
Franks motions.126 In United States v. Davis, the Court did not outright extend the
framework to include omissions but refused to categorically hold that omissions
could never be considered.127
The obvious concern in extending Franks to omissions is the reality that it is
almost impossible for an affiant to include every bit of information gathered during
an initial investigation.128 Few courts have given a detailed account of why omissions
should be included.129 Some courts simply stated that there was no logical reason to
treat omissions differently from misstatements.130 Opponents of the inclusion of omis-
sions argue that omission will rarely affect probable cause and it is significantly more
difficult to determine whether or not an omission was “material” to the probable
cause determination.131
in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false
or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.”).
125 See generally United States v. Owens, 917 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v.
Moody, 931 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Reed, 921 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2019);
United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Perkins, 850 F.3d
1109 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Brown, 857 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2017); United States
v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Dorman, 860 F.3d 675 (D.C.
Cir. 2017); United States v. Danhach, 815 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Thomas,
788 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2012); United
States v. Ruiz, 664 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2012).
126 See generally United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
127 Id. at 694 (“[W]e are not holding that a case never could arise in which an omission
would render a warrant susceptible to attack under Franks. Police could . . . engage in
conduct so overbearing and suggestive that failure to describe these factors would constitute
a deliberate falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth.”).
128 See Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States
v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 1990)).
129 See, e.g., United States v. House, 604 F.2d 1135, 1138–41 (8th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 498 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430,
433 (9th Cir. 1978).
130 See United States v. Haimowitz, 706 F.2d 1549, 1556 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Because
there appears no reason to differentiate between an affirmative statement and a misleading
omission, we assume, without deciding, that the principles of Franks permits an attack on
warrants allegedly deficient as a result of such an omission.”); see also United States v. Lace,
502 F. Supp. 1021, 1045 (D. Vt. 1980) (“The court recognizes that deceptive concealment may
and should be proscribed as a basis for probable cause.” (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 464
F. Supp. 227 (C.D. Cal. 1979))); Lefkowitz, 464 F. Supp. at 233 (“[T]here appears to be no logi-
cal reason to treat an omission differently . . . provided that . . . it leads to a misconception.”).
131 See 40 GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 9:26 (3d ed. 2019).
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III. CRIPPLING FRANKS
The significant confusion surrounding Franks challenges hinders defendants
from being successful.132 Section III.A demonstrates that the Supreme Court consis-
tently refuses to resolve questions about even basic Franks issues.133 Section III.B
outlines the numerous circuit splits on the appellate standard of review, which
significantly contribute to inter-circuit confusion.134 Section III.C provides examples
of smaller decisions made by the lower courts that further undermine Franks.135
A. Supreme Court’s Silence
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Franks more than forty years
ago.136 This period could have given the Court ample time to clarify the standard like
it has done for much of its jurisprudence.137 Instead, the Court has consistently declined
to consider cases with even the most basic of questions concerning veracity chal-
lenges.138 Not only has the Supreme Court declined to rule on issues like the applicable
standard of review,139 but it has also failed to keep the lower courts from chiseling
away at the protections that Franks offers defendants.140
The Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari for even the simplest of questions
regarding Franks motions.141 Recently, it declined to review the Fifth Circuit case
Winfrey v. Rogers that asserted fairly basic questions regarding this type of challenge.142
The petitioner asked the Court: “Does Franks v. Delaware analysis apply when a
court opines information omitted from a warrant application is material to establish-
ing probable cause, and if so, is omitted information evaluated differently than false
statements an officer included in the warrant application?”143 This is just one case
132 See infra Part III.
133 See infra Section III.A.
134 See infra Section III.B.
135 See infra Section III.C.
136 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 154 (1978) (“Decided June 26, 1978.”).
137 See THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 181–219
(2009) (detailing the Supreme Court’s development and refinement of the exclusionary rule).
138 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Gehrmann v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 462
(2018) (No. 18-325), denying cert. to 731 F. App’x 792 (10th Cir.) [hereinafter Gehrmann
Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (“[F]or years now, lower courts have had no guidance as to
whether Franks applies to material omissions . . . .”).
139 See id. at ii; Appellant’s Corrected Reply Brief at 2, 9, Restrepo-Duque v. State, 130
A.3d 340 (Del. 2015) (No. 63, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2413 (2016) (questioning the
standard of review).
140 See supra Sections III.B–C.
141 See Gehrmann Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 138, at i, 21.
142 See generally 901 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1549 (2019).
143 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Winfrey, 139 S. Ct. 1549 (No. 18-1024), denying
cert. to 901 F.3d 483.
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among a litany that have asked similar questions, with the questions often concern-
ing omissions.144 Similarly, the standard of review is often the topic of appeal in Franks
cases.145 Petitioners question the standard of review that does not rely on the facts
found in the lower court since misstatements and omissions are such fact-specific
issues, yet probable cause is a legal determination.146
However, not all appeals are based on such simple issues. For example, the
petitioner in State v. Tichenor147 asked the court to consider: “When redrafting an
affidavit for a search warrant . . . because a police officer recklessly included a
summary of empirical data that was objectively false, should a court substitute a new
summary or set aside the data altogether?”148 The question the petitioner presented,
along with all the other questions that linger around Franks challenges, epitomizes
the confusions that defendants face when trying to hold affiants accountable.149 And,
most importantly, parties struggle to deal with misstatements and omissions and the
implications in assessing whether probable cause remains.150
B. Circuit Split on Standard of Review
A standard of review can be roughly defined as the level of scrutiny an appellate
court will apply when evaluating a lower court’s decision.151 Generally, there are five
standards of appellate review that a federal court can employ: de novo, clear error,
substantial evidence, substantial basis, and abuse of discretion.152 Courts can also
fashion their own “hybrid” standards in some circumstances.153 The applicable standard
144 See Gehrmann Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 138, at i, 21 (asking “[w]hether
Franks applies to material omissions”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Corliss v. Lynott,
137 S. Ct. 2220 (2017) (No. 16-1199), denying cert. to 672 F. App’x 184 (3d Cir.) (mem.)
(questioning whether the reviewing court should “reconstruct the affidavit by inserting the
omissions and correcting inaccuracies to . . . assess whether probable cause exists”).
145 See infra Section III.B. See generally Peter J. Kocoras, Comment, The Proper Appel-
late Standard of Review for Probable Cause to Issue a Search Warrant, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
1413 (1993).
146 See Gehrmann Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 138, at ii (questioning
whether clear error is the standard of review since the issue is based on a lower court’s
factual finding); Appellant’s Corrected Reply Brief, supra note 139, at 2, 9 (questioning
whether de novo is the proper standard of review).
147 See generally No. 2 CA–CR 2015–0380, 2016 WL 4151375 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 4,
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 505 (2017).
148 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Tichenor v. State, 138 S. Ct. 505 (2017) (No. 17-426),
denying cert. to Tichenor, WL4151375.
149 See Brittany H. Southerland, Note, Lying to Catch the Bad Guy: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Likely Adoption of the Clear Error Standard of Review for a Denial of a Franks Hearing, 24
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 851–54 (2008) (describing the current state of Franks hearings).
150 See id. at 863–64.
151 See id. at 856.
152 Kocoras, supra note 145, at 1415.
153 See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 715 F. App’x 454, 456 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that the
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of review often depends on whether the question is one of law or one of fact.154 For
example, de novo is often used for questions of law, while clear error is used for
questions of fact.155 Courts, however, often struggle to pick an appropriate standard
of review when the question presented is a mixed question of law and fact, like Franks
hearings.156 Mixed questions require the appellate court to determine whether certain
historical facts that are usually undisputed meet a legal threshold, like reviewing
whether the remaining facts in an affidavit amount to probable cause.157 For the
purpose of brevity, the scope of this discussion is focused on the use of de novo,
clear error, abuse of discretion, and hybrid standards as they apply to Franks hearings.
The Fifth158 and Tenth Circuits159 have adopted de novo as the standard of review
for the denial of a Franks hearing. Under this standard, the appellate court pays no
deference to the lower court’s findings.160 The belief is that appellate courts are better
suited for making accurate legal decisions.161 Lower court judges are often constrained
by the time pressures of “fast-paced trials” and do not have the luxury of “extended
reflection.”162 Appellate courts, however, are able to focus on questions of law because
the record has already been developed and settled for the purpose of appeals.163 In
theory, if the trial court judge is sufficiently detailed in their analysis of the legal
issue, “little more need be said in the appellate opinion.”164
When reviewing the denial of a Franks hearing de novo, the court is limited to
reviewing the facts present in the affidavit.165 The appellate court will only disturb
the factual findings of the issuing judge if there was “no substantial basis . . . for
probable cause.”166 This is to preserve the deference owed to the magistrate judge.167
proper standard for reviewing the denial of a Franks motions is “clear error as to factual
findings and de novo as to conclusions of law”).
154 See Southerland, supra note 149, at 856.
155 Id.
156 See Christina Gomez, Vexed and Perplexed: Reviewing Mixed Questions of Law and
Fact on Appeal, COLO. LAW., Mar. 2018, at 24, 25 (“Mixed questions of law and fact have
long confounded appellate judges and advocates.”).
157 Id. at 26.
158 See United States v. Signoretto, 535 F. App’x 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2013).
159 See United States v. Ejiofor, 753 F. App’x 611, 616 n.4 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 2729 (2019).
160 Kocoras, supra note 145, at 1416.
161 See id. at 1418.
162 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991) (quoting Dan T. Coenen,
To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court
Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 923 (1989)).
163 See id. at 232.
164 Id. at 232–33.
165 United States v. Ejiofor, 753 F. App’x 611, 614 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 2729 (2019).
166 Id.
167 Id.; see United States v. Thornton, 454 F.2d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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The First168 and Seventh Circuits169 use the clear error standard while the Eighth170
and Eleventh Circuits171 use the abuse of discretion standard. While seemingly different
standards, the Supreme Court has found that the “abuse-of-discretion and clearly
erroneous standards are indistinguishable.”172 Under these standards, the appellate
court defers to the findings of the trial court in the belief that the trial judge is in a better
position to weigh and evaluate evidence.173 By applying clear error, the appellate
court “adhere[s] to the presumption that the affidavit supporting the warrant is
valid.”174 Therefore, “[c]lear error ‘exists only when [the appellate court is] left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”175
The Second,176 Sixth,177 Ninth,178 and Fourth Circuits179 created a hybrid standard
for review of Franks motions. This is a bifurcated approach where the appellate court
applies de novo to the legal findings but clear error to the factual findings.180 This
is a typical approach for reviewing the denial of suppression hearings because they
often deal with questions of mixed law and fact.181
The most problematic, however, is the Third Circuit, which has still not established
a specific standard of review.182 Unfortunately for defendants, this means that, when
appealing in the Third Circuit, they must argue that their appeal meets both de novo
and abuse of discretion standards.183 This is an unfair burden for defendants to bear
simply because the Third Circuit does not want to “enter the fray” of circuit splits.184
168 See United States v. Graf, 784 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2015).
169 See United States v. Daniels, 906 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2018).
170 See United States v. Bradley, 924 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 2019) (“To obtain a Franks
hearing, a defendant must make ‘a substantial preliminary showing’ that an affidavit contains
an intentional or reckless false statement or omission necessary to the probable cause
finding.” (quoting United States v. Charles, 895 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2018))).
171 See United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004); see also United
States v. Aldissi, 758 F. App’x 694, 709 (11th Cir. 2018).
172 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990).
173 See Kocoras, supra note 145, at 1415.
174 Southerland, supra note 149, at 862.
175 United States v. Graf, 784 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hicks,
575 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 2009)).
176 See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 153 (2d Cir. 2013).
177 See United States v. Mastromatteo, 538 F.3d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 2008).
178 See United States v. Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2019).
179 See United States v. Robinson, 770 F. App’x 627, 628 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United
States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011)).
180 See Gomez, supra note 156, at 27–28 (explaining generally how a bifurcated standard
of review works).
181 See United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1998); Julia Luyster, Appellate
Standards of Review in Criminal Matters, Part 2, FLA. BAR J., June 2007, at 64, 64.
182 See United States v. Aviles, 938 F.3d 503, 509 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019).
183 See id.
184 See id.; United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665–66 (3d Cir. 2012).
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Regardless of any conclusion on a superior standard of review, this uncertainty
does nothing but damage Franks motions.185 While courts and academics debate the
pros and cons of de novo versus clear error, few, if any, are focused on the actual
practical analysis of perjured affidavits.186 Developing a detailed record below is
important for appeals, no matter the standard the appellate court applies.187 If trial
courts cannot clearly, transparently, and meticulously evaluate a motion for a Franks
hearing (knowing how to excise misstatements and which omissions to include) then
appellate courts should resort to de novo review because the trial courts’ decisions
are not worthy of deference.188 Whereas, if given proper guidance on how to evalu-
ate the affidavit, then a lower standard like clear error may be warranted.189
C. Other Chips in the Foundation
The circuit courts have formed their own minor rules that, while seemingly
slight, can have a significant impact on a defendant’s success in arguing for a
Franks motion. Most issues that defendants face come in the form of informant-
supplied information included in the affidavit.190 When it handed down Franks, the
Supreme Court was conscious of the problems that informant tips could cause.191
Thus, in setting the framework for the challenge, the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that “[i]f an informant’s tip is the source of information, the affidavit must recite
some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the
informant . . . was credible or his information reliable.”192 The affiant must also
include “the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
relevant evidence might be discovered.”193
At first blush, these seem like fairly robust requirements to ensure that affiants
are relying on honest and reliable informant tips.194 But in practice, it has not been
185 See, e.g., Gard, supra note 8, at 446–47 (“[T]he only area where lower courts have
been consistent exists in erecting inappropriate barriers to the vindication of the serious
wrongs perpetuated by perjured warrant affidavits.”).
186 See id. at 446, 462, 475 (focusing on the other problems that defendants face when
motioning for a Franks hearing: the difficulty of making a substantial preliminary showing,
the “informant privilege,” and the malleability of probable cause).
187 See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (“With the record
having been constructed below and settled for purposes of the appeal, appellate judges are
able to devote their primary attention to legal issues” when using the de novo standard.);
Gomez, supra note 156, at 25 (“Under [clear error], the reviewing court defers to the lower
court’s factual findings, reversing them only if they lack factual support in the record . . . .”).
188 See Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 238 (“When de novo review is compelled, no form
of appellate deference is acceptable.”).
189 See id.
190 See Gard, supra note 8, at 450–51.
191 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See generally id.
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so. For example, the Sixth Circuit does not require the affiant to verify all of the
information presented by an informant.195 Granted, it would be impractical to verify
everything, but the circuit permits the use of information that could only be verified
by the search warrant itself.196 That seems like a very precarious line of logic. More-
over, when evaluating the informant’s reliability, where the informant is known to
the officer, the circuit does not require the affiant to “verify independently any of
the information provided by the informant.”197 That seems counter to the very
requirements laid out by the Supreme Court in Franks.198
Furthermore, if an informant’s identity is confidential, law enforcement is able
to protect “more than just the name of the informant.”199 The informant privilege
also “extends to information that would tend to reveal the identity of the informant.”200
How can a defendant make a “substantial preliminary” showing of intentional mis-
statements or omissions if law enforcement can shield the majority of the informa-
tion used in the affidavit under the guise of protecting a confidential informant?201
The tough answer is that they cannot meet this high burden.202
IV. THE SOLUTION: “SHOW YOUR WORK”
“[W]hen material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard
is set to one side, [and] there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to
195 United States v. Crawford, 943 F.3d 297, 306 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v.
Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558,
565 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of adverse
informant credibility information.”); United States v. Bradley, 924 F.3d 476, 480–81 (8th
Cir. 2019) (holding that other confidential informant tips can be used to bolster another
informant’s information). But see Clark, 935 F.3d at 564 (describing five factors a court
should consider in determining the reliability of an informant’s tip in a search warrant
affidavit); United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2015) (“An informant’s
trustworthiness may be enhanced in a number of ways, including his willingness to reveal
his identity, the level of detail in his account, the basis of his knowledge, and the extent to
which his statements are against his interest.”).
196 See Crawford, 943 F.3d at 306.
197 Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir.
2006) (“[A] known informant’s tip is thought to be more reliable than an anonymous
informant’s tip.”); United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Information
may be sufficiently reliable . . . if the [informant] . . . has a track record of supplying reliable
information . . . .”). But see United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding statements from an informant who may be unreliable can still establish probable
cause if police corroborate the information), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1018 (2011).
198 See Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.
199 United States v. Tzannos, 460 F.3d 128, 140 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Napier, 436 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006)).
200 Id. (quoting Napier, 436 F.3d at 1136).
201 See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56.
202 See, e.g., United States v. Nuzzolilo, 355 F. Supp. 3d 29, 33 (D. Mass. 2019).
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support a finding of probable cause,” then the defendant’s challenge fails.203 Courts
should take the affidavit, append it to their opinions, and directly edit the text. Some
courts do attempt to lay out their reasoning, either by listing the undisturbed facts204
or quoting snippets of the affidavit with omissions interspliced.205 However, display-
ing an entire affidavit will provide other courts, the prosecution, and the defense
with a clearer image of how to tackle these claims.206
A. “Redlining” the Affidavit
Instead of extracting phrases to include in an opinion, judges should take the
entire affidavit and append it to the opinion. One rationale behind this requirement
is that it will preserve fact-finding for an appeal.207 Another rationale is that it will give
parties, both the prosecution and the defense, a better understanding of what courts
are looking for when analyzing unconstitutional conduct by the affiant.208
Practically, the step is simple. To start, the judge should go through the affidavit
in its entirety and strike through the misstatements. This is not too drastic of a change
from most courts’ approaches.209 As the Fourth Circuit recently explained, courts “us[e]
a simple test.”210 Courts “revise” the affidavit and “examin[e] the information contained
within the ‘revised’ affidavit, [and] evaluate whether there nevertheless would have
been probable cause to issue the warrant.”211 For the most part, this analysis is mainly
mental, usually with the court only listing the unaffected facts to justify a finding of
probable cause.212 However, courts have varying degrees of depth to their analysis.213
The circuits should encourage the district judges to lay out their reasoning in the
context of the entire affidavit to clarify and standardize these opinions. “The key
inquiry in resolving a Franks motion is whether probable cause remains once any
misrepresentations are corrected”214 and seeing the affidavit in its totality will certainly
help in that endeavor.
203 Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72 (emphasis added).
204 See, e.g., United States v. Aviles, 938 F.3d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 2019).
205 See, e.g., Nuzzolilo, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 33–34.
206 See infra Section IV.C.
207 See, e.g., Aviles, 938 F.3d at 509.
208 See infra Section IV.C.
209 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 942 F.3d 634, 640 (4th Cir. 2019).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 382 F. Supp. 3d 966, 970–73, 980–89 (E.D. Cal.
2019); United States v. Nuzzolilo, 355 F. Supp. 3d 29, 34 (D. Mass. 2019).
213 Compare United States v. Aviles, 938 F.3d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 2019), United States v.
Akroush, No. 1:15-cr-00286-DAD-BAM, slip op. at 6–10 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2019), and
United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), with Romero, 382 F. Supp.
3d at 970–73, 980–89, United States v. Peralta, 361 F. Supp. 3d 313, 321–22 (N.D.N.Y.
2019), and United States v. Lewis, 386 F. Supp. 3d 963, 968–72 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (applying
varying amounts of analysis to the facts in challenged affidavits).
214 United States v. Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2019).
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B. Limiting the Introduction of Omissions
Omissions present more difficulty because, while all of the circuits have extended
Franks to include them, there is little guidance on how they should be interpreted
since the original opinion did not involve them.215 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out,
“[i]f an affidavit can be challenged because of material omissions, the literal Franks
approach no longer seems adequate because, by their nature, omissions cannot be
deleted.”216 Instead, the omissions must be “corrected and supplemented.”217
Essentially, the judge should only consider the omissions raised by the defense.
Some courts, while not explicitly, only list the omissions that are offered by the
defense.218 However, there is no explicit rule that the government cannot introduce
information in order to contextualize the omissions.219
In fact, it appears that the Second Circuit’s approach allowed judges to consider
all information that the affiant had at the time of their warrant application.220 This
approach is incorrect. If judges are allowed to consider everything, regardless of
whether or not it was presented to the magistrate during the application process, then
law enforcement is almost incentivized “to file intentionally or recklessly false warrant
affidavits because they can never end in a worse situation for doing so.”221 If they
lie and are caught, they can flood the court with more information, drowning out the
defendant’s claims.222 This undermines the purpose of a Franks challenge, which is
to deter unconstitutional police conduct.223
Limiting the omissions does not mean that the judge must interpret them in the
same way as the defense.224 The defense will argue that the addition of these omis-
sions will negate the finding of probable cause,225 but the court should be free to
view them as doing so or as another set of facts that support the finding of probable
cause.
215 See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (lacking any mention of
omissions in warrant affidavits).
216 United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1487 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).
217 Norris, 942 F.3d at 910.
218 See, e.g., Lewis, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 968–72; United States v. Brooks, 358 F. Supp. 3d
440, 474 (W.D. Pa. 2018).
219 See Gard, supra note 8, at 476.
220 See id. at 457, 476.
221 Id. at 476.
222 See id.
223 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (“The primary justification for the exclu-
sionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.”).
224 See, e.g., United States v. Razo-Quiroz, No.1:19-cr-00015-DAD-BAM, 2019 WL
3035556, at *10–12 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2019).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 942 F.3d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We disagree with
Jones’ contention that the omitted statements were material to the magistrate’s probable
cause determination.”).
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C. Justifications
One major benefit of appending the affidavit to the opinion and redlining is that
facts are very clearly preserved for appeal. “Even a cursory glance at the case law
surrounding Franks hearings shows the prevailing importance of facts,” because
facts can cause “[c]ases [to] rise or fall on the parsing of a single affidavit statement.”226
Admittedly, some circuits do not apply a standard of review that requires the preserva-
tion of facts.227 But this strategy will be particularly helpful to the circuits that do not
review the lower courts’ findings of facts during appellate review of the denial of
a hearing or suppression.228 By delineating in detail the misstatements and omissions
actually considered in determining whether the finding of probable cause is affected,
judges will produce opinions that can give other defendants, prosecutors, and even
other judges a better idea of how to frame these challenges.229
Furthermore, if courts are forced to provide an in-depth analysis on the Franks
issues raised by defendants, then later courts may not be tempted to cite the wrong
case law. For example, the Fourth Circuit decided a case that failed to cite Franks
v. Delaware as the deciding law despite the clear Franks challenges that were being
made.230 In 2011, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Doyle.231 While the
Franks challenge was not the key issue in the case, the court was unfazed by the
district court’s disposal of the claim using Rugendorf v. United States.232 Recall that
Rugendorf was decided before Franks, and the Supreme Court avoided holding that
defendants could challenge the veracity of a warrant by deciding that the allegations
of falsity were merely “peripheral” to the finding of probable cause.233
Most importantly, appending the affidavit would be entirely in line with the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Franks. At the end of its opinion, the Court attached the
affidavit in question.234 While the affidavit appears in its entirety, misstatements
226 David Holesinger, The End of the Backdoor Search: Using Ornelas’s Review Standard
to Prevent Illegal Searches Based on Falsely Sworn Police Affidavits, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
737, 750.
227 Compare United States v. Signoretto, 535 F. App’x 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying
de novo as the standard of review for the denial of a Franks hearing challenge), with United
States v. Graf, 784 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying clear error as the standard of review
for the denial of Franks hearings).
228 See supra Section III.B.
229 But see United States v. Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2019) (listing all of the
omissions alleged by the defendant but failing to indicate which ones were considered or
what facts remained after the affidavit was “corrected”).
230 See United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 468 (4th Cir. 2011).
231 See generally id.
232 See id. at 468 (citing Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531–32 (1964)).
233 See Rugendorf, 376 U.S. at 532.
234 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, app. A (1978).
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included, the Court must have reasoned that the best way to understand its ruling
was to see the original document.235
V. UNCONVINCING CRITIQUES OF THE “REDLINING” METHOD
This Part outlines the major objections that could be raised if courts are required
to append the “corrected” affidavit to their opinions.236 Such a detailed revision of
warrants may result in a hypertechnical review, instead of a commonsense review,
of warrants.237 However, none of these criticisms are true deterrents of the approach
that this Note advocates.
A. Probable Cause as a Fluid Standard
As noted in Section I.B, probable cause is not an exact legal rule.238 “Articulating
precisely what . . . probable cause mean[s] is not possible.”239 It is a “commonsense,
nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’”240
In Franks, the Supreme Court was partially motivated by a desire to protect the
probable cause standard when it handed down its ruling.241 The Court believed that
a total bar on challenging the veracity of a search warrant affidavit would reduce the
probable cause requirement “to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliber-
ately falsified allegations . . . and . . . then was able to remain confident that the ploy
was worthwhile.”242
Basically, while probable cause is a fluid standard, not setting a limitation on the
omissions the court can consider would make having Franks hearings essentially
moot.243 There would never not be an incentive to lie.244 That is why this Note proposes
not to limit courts to the defense’s interpretation of the omissions.245 It provides some
kind of flexibility within this framework.246
235 See id. (showing that numbers fifteen through seventeen of the affidavit are the lies the
Court determined were material to the finding of probable cause).
236 See infra Sections V.A–B.
237 See infra Section V.A.
238 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
239 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
240 Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231).
241 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 168 (1978).
242 Id.
243 See Gard, supra note 8, at 476 (discussing the implications of the “corrected affidavits
approach”).
244 See id.
245 See supra Section IV.B.
246 See supra Section IV.B.
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B. Affidavits as Practical Documents
The Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca specifically mandated that
“courts should not invalidate [a] warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hyper-
technical, rather than a commonsense manner.”247 Therefore, traditionally warrants
issued by the magistrate are treated with deference.248 This deference stems from the
practical reality that “[t]he pre-search proceeding will frequently be marked by haste,
because of the understandable desire to act before the evidence disappears; this
urgency will not always permit the magistrate to make an extended independent
examination of the affiant or other witnesses.”249
However, it is precisely the haste of a criminal investigation that should give
courts pause. “[T]he hearing before a magistrate is frequently done hastily in order
to avoid losing evidence . . . .”250 Thus, reviewing courts must be willing to scruti-
nize affidavits because the hearing before the magistrate will “not always ‘suffice to
discourage lawless or reckless misconduct.’”251 Magistrates and law enforcement
officers cannot be left to police themselves because “[s]elf-scrutiny is a lofty ideal.”252
C. Deference to the Issuing Magistrate Judge
When evaluating a challenge to a search warrant and its affidavit, precedent
requires the reviewing court to show “great deference to the issuing judge’s determi-
nation . . . of probable cause.”253 The belief is that magistrates will require a “higher”
standard of probable cause than reviewing courts, given judicial biases.254 The magis-
trate is the one dealing with the facts in the first instance, and an after-the-fact review
would contradict the premise that warrants are generally trustworthy.255
Another rationale behind this is that “the more scrutiny appellate courts give to
an affidavit, the higher the chance . . . the affidavit will be deemed insufficient to
establish probable cause.”256 This is especially critical since Justice Rehnquist’s
247 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
248 See id.
249 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978).
250 Southerland, supra note 149, at 853–54 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 169).
251 Id. at 854.
252 Franks, 438 U.S. at 169 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949)).
253 See United States v. Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 556, 558 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United
States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010)); United States v. Bradley, 924 F.3d 476,
480 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Faulkner, 826 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2016));
United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 173 (4th Cir. 2011).
254 See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 926 (1991).
255 See id. at 928.
256 Drey Cooley, Clearly Erroneous Review Is Clearly Erroneous: Reinterpreting Illinois
v. Gates and Advocating De Novo Review for a Magistrate’s Determination of Probable
Cause in Applications for Search Warrants, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 91 (2006).
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major concern in his Franks dissent was that veracity challenges would result in
lawyers “ceaselessly undermin[ing] the limitations which the Court has placed on
impeachment of the affidavit offered in support of a search warrant.”257 This defer-
ence seems inconsistent with a strict appellate review of a search warrant affidavit,
like appending the edited affidavit to a judicial opinion.
However, much of this deference appears to fall away if the court finds that
there are significant lies or omissions since this deference is based on the idea that
law enforcement officers are offering a truthful showing to the magistrate judge. The
Supreme Court wrote in its opinion in Franks: “[A]llowing an evidentiary hearing,
after a suitable preliminary proffer of material falsity, would not diminish the
importance and solemnity of the warrant-issuing process. . . . A magistrate’s deter-
mination is presently subject to review before trial as to sufficiency without any
undue interference with the dignity of the magistrate’s function.”258
It is not necessarily the capacity of the magistrate judge that is being questioned
but the bad actions of the affiant when the other party is not present to keep them in
check.259 Therefore, if the affidavit is available in its entirety to the reviewing court,
it is not the magistrate judge’s decision that is being reviewed but instead the affiant’s
actions.260 Attaching the affidavit for appellate review would not be contrary to the
deference owed to the magistrate judge. So long as “the missing information does
not taint the remainder of the affidavit, there is no reason for [courts] to abandon [a]
deferential approach.”261 Deference and Franks motions do not have to be mutually
exclusive. “Deference to the magistrate . . . is not boundless” and “does not preclude
inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which [the probable
cause determination] was based.”262
CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the botched “Harding Street Raid,” lying in a search warrant
affidavit can have deadly consequences.263 While law enforcement should be in the
business of policing themselves, it is also the judicial system’s duty to ensure that,
when there are allegations of falsity, the review is thorough and the consequences
are severe enough to have a deterrent effect.264
257 Franks, 438 U.S. at 187 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 169–70.
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 United States v. Santiago, 905 F.3d 1013, 1022 n.24 (7th Cir. 2018).
262 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
263 See Mervosh, supra note 6; Grand Jury Indicts Former HPD Officers for Alleged
Involvement in Harding Street Raid, supra note 7.
264 See Florian Martin, Advocacy Group Wants Whistleblower Committee for Houston
Police Officers, HOUS.PUB.MEDIA (Jan. 27, 2020, 5:24 PM), https://www.houstonpublicme
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Appending a “redlined” affidavit to a court opinion is just one commonsense
step in correcting the damage that has been done to Franks motions and the Fourth
Amendment. The core protection of the Warrant Clause comes from the assumption
that the affiant is giving a truthful presentation of the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the need for a warrant.265 When the system continuously allows law enforcement
to subvert the probable cause requirement with subterfuge and lies, the entire opinion
of Franks v. Delaware becomes meaningless.
What started as a single Supreme Court opinion has transformed into a nebulous
cloud of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in which the prosecution, the defense,
and the courts get lost. Whether it is squabbling over the proper standard of review266
or inventing little niche rules,267 the circuit courts are failing to provide clear guid-
ance for their trial courts.
As a result of the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuits have
successfully whittled Franks motions into another trial strategy that rarely works.268
By requiring courts to be specific in “correcting” the affidavit, the judicial systems
will be able to ensure that defendants will have a fair shot at challenging unconstitu-
tional law enforcement conduct. It is not a perfect solution, but it may give defen-
dants a tool to sort through the Franks mess.
dia.org/articles/news/2020/01/27/358601/advocacy-group-wants-whistleblower-committee
-for-houston-police-officers/ [https://perma.cc/P4DU-W858].
265 See supra Section I.A.
266 See supra Section III.B.
267 See supra Section III.C.
268 Thomas R. Bowman, Conflicts in Withholding Classified Evidence from Criminal
Defendants: Looking Beyond Statutory Compliance in United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479,
(7th Cir. 2014), 42 S. ILL. U. L.J. 99, 107 (2018) (“As a general matter of criminal procedure,
Franks motions are routinely filed, but hearings on the motion are infrequently granted.”).
